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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ashli Marie Easterday appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence found in a search of her purse. Below, she asserted that, following a 
traffic stop and a canine alert on her vehicle, the officer illegally searched her purse. The 
district court denied the motion, and Ms. Easterday entered a conditional plea of guilty, 
preserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the afternoon of July 2013, Deputy Stacy Gorrell, the Twin Falls Sherriff's 
Office, pulled over a vehicle driven by Ms. Ashli Easterday. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.11, L.8 p.13, 
L.18.) Deputy Gorrell had earlier received a call from a man saying that he had loaned 
his car to his ex-girlfriend, but she had not returned it to him. 1 (Tr. 8/2/13, p.12, Ls.6-15.) 
The owner gave Deputy Gorrell a description of the car and the license plate number, 
and, shortly thereafter, Deputy Gorrell saw the car at a stoplight and stopped it. 
(Tr. 8/2/13, p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.3.) When he made contact with Ms. Easterday, he told 
her that she did not have permission to be driving the vehicle, and she could call 
someone to come and pick her up. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.18, Ls.7-16.) 
Apparently because Deputy Gorrell thought Ms. Easterday was nervous when he 
was talking with her, he called in Buhl Police Canine Officer Engbaum. (R., pp.9-10.) 
When Officer Engbaum arrived, his dog performed a "free-air sniff" around the car. 
(Tr. 8/2/13, p.7, Ls.3-15.) And, according to Officer Engbaum, his dog alerted on the 
1 Deputy Gorrell was told by his dispatch to call the owner regarding the complaint, and 
apparently, the owner was returning his call. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.17, Ls.9-16.) 
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driver's side and passenger's side doors, so he reported this to Deputy Gorrell. 
(Tr. 8/2/13, p. 7, Ls.16-22.) Deputy Gorrell explained that he then went back to the car, 
told Ms. Easterday about the aleti, and asked her to step out. (R., p.1 O; Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, 
Ls.1-3.) He said that when she complied, she "grabbed her purse," which had been 
sitting "right beside her" on the front bench seat. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.4-19, p.18, L.20-
p.19, L.1.) 
Ms. Easterday then walked back to the patrol car with Deputy Gorrell, and he told 
her that he was going to search her purse because it was sitting on the seat when the 
dog indicated on the car. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.15, Ls.21-25; R., p10.) Ms. Easterday did not 
consent to the search and became "really agitated" and "asked why her purse had 
anything to do with the stop." (Tr. 8/2/13, p.20, Ls.1-6; R., p.10.) Deputy Gorrell said he 
told her that when the dog indicated on the vehicle, that gave him probable cause to 
search the car and the bags in the car, and she had to let him search it, so she finally 
gave him her purse. (Tr. 8/2/13, p.20, Ls.1-6; R., p.10.) When he searched the purse, 
Deputy Gorrell found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (Tr., 8/2/13, p.16, 
Ls.1-8.) 
As a result, Deputy Gorrell arrested Ms. Easterday, and she was subsequently 
charged with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.10, 63-65.) She filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence, and a memorandum in support of the motion, arguing 
that the search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.82-90.) After 
a hearing, the district court denied the motion because it found that, despite the fact that 
Ms. Easterday exited the car with her purse, she did not attempt "to make the purse part 
of her person prior to the time that probable cause to search was established." 
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(R., pp.104-05.) Ms. Easterday then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance; that plea preserved her ability to challenge the 
district court's order denying her motion to suppress. (R., pp.108-117.) Later, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Ms. Easterday on probation for three years. (R., pp.140-151.) 
Ms. Easterday then filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of 
conviction and the order placing her on probation. (R., pp.164-167.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress because 
Deputy Gorrell impermissibly expanded the search of the car to a search of 
Ms. Easterday's person? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's Motion To Suppress Because 
Deputy Gorrell lmpermissibly Expanded The Search Of The Car To A Search Of 
Ms. Easterday's Person 
A. Introduction 
The district court should have granted Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress 
because Officer Gorrell illegally searched her purse, which should have considered 
part of her person when she exited the car with it. Therefore, the purse was not subject 
to search under the automobile exception absent some further justification beyond the 
canine alert on car. 
B. Standard of Review 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the 
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. Neither party 
disputes the facts in this case. Thus the Court has free review as to whether the police 
officer's actions were permitted under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 
601, 604 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Easterday's Motion To Suppress 
Because It Interpreted The Precedent On This Issue In A Way That Could I ead 
To An Unworkable Rule 
1. Ms. Easterday Took Her Purse With Her When She Exited The Car, So It 
Should Have Been Considered Part Of Her Person And Not Subject To 
Search 
When Ms. Easterday stepped out of her car, she took her purse, which had been 
sitting right next to her on the seat of the car where women ordinarily place a purse while 
driving and while getting items such as a driver's license out of the purse. (Tr. 8/2/13, 
p.15, Ls.4-19.) Therefore, it was part of her person and not subject to search under 
these circumstances. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section 17 
of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right is to 
"impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental 
agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary 
invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches or 
detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
A traffic stop is a seizure of the driver in a vehicle and "is therefore subject to 
Fourth Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is 
analogous to an investigative detention." State v. Stewarl, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 
2008). Once an officer has stopped a vehicle, a subsequent investigation "can ripen into 
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probable cause as soon as a drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, 
justifying a search of the vehicle without the necessity of a warrant" based on the 
automobile exception. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999) (citing State v. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992)). VVhile that exception exists, it has a limited scope 
because the "occupants of a car continue to have a heightened expectation of privacy, 
which protects against personal searches without a warrant." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 
277, 282 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999)). Thus 
the automobile exception allows searches of containers that may hold contraband but 
does not automatically allow searches of drivers and passengers. 
Purses, when in normal use, enjoy heightened protection from searches because 
they are considered part of the person. In Idaho, when a driver or passenger attempts to 
take her purse with her when exiting the vehicle, the purse is part of her person and not 
subject to search under the automobile exception. See State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 
698, 700 (1998); State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162-63 (2000). When purses are not 
left in the vehicle voluntarily, they are not subject to search. Newsom, 132 Idaho at 700. 
In Newsom, Boise police officers stopped a car after learning that the registered owner 
had felony arrest warrants, and they asked the passenger (Ms. Newsom) to get out. Id. 
at 699. When she did, she attempted to bring her purse with her. However, one of the 
officers told her to leave it in the car. Id. Upon a subsequent search of the vehicle 
incident to the driver's arrest, the other officer on scene searched Ms. Newsom's purse 
and found methamphetamine. Id. The district court denied her motion to suppress, and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme Court held that when 
the defendant attempted to bring her purse, which had been sitting in her lap, with her 
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and did not "leave the purse in the vehicle voluntarily," the search of her purse was 
unlawful because "the purse was entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search 
and seizure as the passenger herself." Id. at 700. 
Two years later, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the holding in Newsom and 
illustrated the crucial issue in these cases-whether the owner of the purse attempts to 
take the purse out of the car when asked to exit. Holland, 135 Idaho at 163. In Holland, 
the defendant was once again a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police. Id. 
at 160. After pulling the vehicle over, the deputy discovered that there was a warrant for 
the driver's arrest and promptly arrested him. Id. The deputy then asked the passenger 
(Ms. Holland) to step out of the vehicle because it had to be impounded. Id. The Court 
stated that "[e]ither while she was exiting the car, or shortly thereafter," she asked to take 
a jacket and purse with her that were still in the car. Id. The officer agreed but said he 
would have to search the purse for weapons first; when he did, he found 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Id. 
In support of her motion to suppress, Ms. Holland argued that, based on Newsom, 
the search of her purse exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest of the driver. 
Id. at 162. The Court explained that the only reason the purse in Newsom "became a 
container inside the passenger compartment and subject to the search incident to the 
arrest of the driver was because the police ordered Newsom to place her purse back 
inside the vehicle." Id. The Court also said that "[t]he holding in Newsom does not stand 
for the proposition that a passenger's belongings may never be searched. Instead, 
Newsom stands for the proposition that the police cannot create a right to search a 
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container by placing it within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering 
someone else to place it there for them." Id. at 163. 
The Court then pointed out that Ms. Holland did not take her purse with her, and 
the police did not put her purse back in the car or "order her to place it there. Instead, as 
Holland exited the vehicle she voluntarily left her purse behind. The purse was, 
therefore, a container within the passenger compartment of the vehicle and subject to a 
search incident to the arrest of the driver." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court made 
it clear that the meaningful distinction between the two cases was whether the owner of 
the purse took it with her or left it behind when exiting the car. 
In a subsequent case, after stopping a car for a seat belt infraction, police 
discovered there was an arrest warrant for one of the passengers. State v. Roe, 140 
Idaho 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2004). After arresting him, the officers asked the other 
passengers to step out of the car so they could search the back seat compartment. Id. 
As one of them (Mr. Roe) was exiting, he tried to bring a pair of shorts with him. Id. The 
officer told Mr. Roe to leave them in the vehicle and subsequently found marijuana in the 
pocket of the shorts. Id. Later, Mr. Roe filed a motion to suppress arguing, inter alia, 
that, based on the holding in Newsom, the police had no grounds to tell him to leave his 
shorts in the car. Id. The district court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Id. 
The Court of Appeals stated "We agree that a purse and perhaps a billfold are 
items that can be considered part of the person, much like the clothing a person is 
wearing." Id. at 183. The Court eventually held that "a pair of shorts not being worn at 
the time and which are not ordinarily carried with a person is more akin to a container 
found inside a vehicle. We conclude that a passenger cannot, upon being asked to exit a 
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vehicle, extract various containers from the vehicle to avoid search of the containers." 
Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court of Appeals made it clear once again 
that what matters is whether the purse is taken with its owner. And, unlike a pair of 
shorts which are not ordinarily carried with a person when leaving a car, a purse is 
ordinarily carried with a person, but not until that person exits the car, especially if the 
owner of the purse is the driver, as was the case here. 
Less than a year later, in a case with very similar facts to this case, the Court of 
Appeals held that a man's wallet, found in his jacket after a drug dog alerted on his car, 
could not be searched under the automobile exception. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 
282 (Ct. App. 2005). There, as here, after one officer pulled the car over, a second 
officer arrived with a drug detection canine. Id. at 280. While the occupants were still in 
the vehicle, the canine alerted on the passenger door. Id. As a result, the officers asked 
Mr. Gibson to step out of the car, searched the car, then patted him down, and removed 
his wallet from his jacket. Id. They subsequently searched the wallet and found 
methamphetamine. Id. 
The district court denied Mr. Gibson's motion to suppress "finding that the dog's 
alert gave the officers probable cause to suspect that there were drugs either in the 
vehicle or on its occupants." Id. However, in discussing the search of Mr. Gibson, the 
Court of Appeals reaffirmed that "personal searches of vehicle occupants are not 
authorized under the automobile exception as a result of the occupant's mere presence 
within a vehicle" when probable cause is established. Id. at 282. As a result, it held that 
the district court erred when it found that the officers could search Mr. Gibson's person, 
which included his wallet, when they did not find any contraband in his car. Id. 
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There is no meaningful difference between the facts in Gibson and the facts in this 
case other than the fact that Ms. Easterday exited her car with a purse instead of a 
wallet, and Idaho precedent clearly demonstrates that purses enjoy the same protection 
as wallets. And, notably, there was absolutely no discussion in Gibson of where 
Mr. Gibson's wallet was located prior to him exiting the car. Indeed, after he was pulled 
over, he likely had to take his wallet out of his jacket to show his driver's license to the 
officers. When he did, he may well have set his wallet down on the console next to him. 
The reason there was no discussion of where the wallet was prior to his exiting the 
vehicle, and no conjecture along these lines, is because the location of the purse or 
wallet within the car is largely irrelevant, unless, perhaps, it is a "considerable distance"2 
from its owner. Rather, the crucial issue is whether the defendant brings the purse or 
wallet out of the car. 
Here, instead of acknowledging that Gibson should control, the district court, in its 
Memorandum Opinion denying Ms. Easterday's motion to suppress, largely ignored 
Gibson and asserted that "Idaho case law does not provide a ready answer to the 
question ... presently before the Court." (R, p.100.) It then went on to discuss the 
above cases, and two cases out of Kansas, before arriving at the surprising conclusion 
that whether the defendant leaves the car with the purse is not the crucial issue, because 
the protection given to purses only applies if the defendant takes some action, such as 
placing the purse in her lap, before probable cause to search the car is established. 
2 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer J., concurring). Justice 
Breyer agreed that the purse in question was subject to search because it was found at a 
"considerable distance from its owner" i.e., still in the car after she had exited, and she 
did not "claim ownership" of the purse until after the officer "discovered her identification 
while looking through it." 
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(R., p.105.) But this was never an issue in Gibson. Indeed, there was no finding there 
that Mr. Gibson's wallet was actually attached to him when the dog alerted on his 
vehicle. It was not a relevant fact. 
The district court went on to say that the Hofland case "although factually similar, 
does not answer the question posed in the instant case because in Holland, the 
defendant voluntarily left her purse in the car." (R., p.100.) To the contrary, it actually 
does answer the question because the contrast with Newsom is highly instructive. The 
district court also said that Holland was not helpful because "the Idaho Supreme Court 
resolved that case through the application of the incident to arrest doctrine .... " 
(R., p.100.) But it failed to acknowledge that Newsom also involved the incident to arrest 
doctrine and yet it did not hesitate to say that, based on Newsom, Ms. Easterday's purse 
had to have been in her lap when the drug dog alerted in order for her purse to be 
considered part of her person. (R., p.104.) Clearly, the application of that doctrine does 
not affect the facts surrounding the purses or the protection to which they are entitled. 
Again, the crucial issue is whether the purse is attached to the person when she leaves 
the car, as it is ordinarily carried, or is voluntarily left in the car. The location of the purse 
is a peripheral issue, and the district court's focus on this issue leads to the unworkable 
rule discussed below. 
2. The District Court's Interpretation Of Precedent Was Flawed And Would 
Create An Unworkable Rule That Would Pose A Host Of Potential Privacy 
Concerns And Pitfalls For Law Enforcement Attempting To Enforce It 
Ultimately, the district court's synthesis of the precedent led to the following ruling: 
(1) a citizen in an automobile can have a privacy interest in a purse that 
trumps the container search rule enunciated in Ross [United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982]; (2) in order to assert that privacy interest, a 
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some such voluntarily removing (or attempting 
remove) the purse from automobile when exiting; (3) the protections 
in (1) and only apply if: (a) there is no probable cause 
the purse before the citizen is removed from the car or (b) there is 
no independent to search the citizen (such as search incident to 
arrest or the presence of other factors as described in Gibson, 141 Idaho 
277, 108 P.3d 424). 
(R., p.104.) 
While the first two points are accurate, the third point is not supported by Idaho 
case law-specifically Gibson. The district court's reference to the "other factors" in 
Gibson actually concerns a completely different issue-whether probable cause existed 
to arrest Mr. Gibson for possession of a controlled substance prior to the search of the 
wallet such that the search would have been valid as a search incident to See 
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282. Those factors were not relevant to the issue of whether the 
search of his wallet was lawful based on the automobile exception. Indeed, the State 
actually conceded this issue on appeal. Id. Thus, Gibson makes it clear that a dog alert 
on a car does not destroy a citizen's expectation of privacy in a wallet, and, therefore, a 
purse. 
Moreover, as Ms. Easterday's counsel argued below, such a rule could create a 
myriad of problems and would discriminate against women. Men often carry wallets 
only; women tend to carry purses because they need to carry more personal items, such 
as feminine hygiene products. Wallets can stay in a pocket while seated, but purses 
have to be put down-especially if the owner of the purse is driving. 
Also, if a woman was actually aware of a rule such as this, and moved her purse 
onto her lap preemptively, this action might create suspicion in the mind of the officer 
speaking with her through her window. Further, men's wallets, though smaller and 
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carried in a pocket, nevertheless usually have to be brought out to provide identification, 
so this could become sort of a game. For example, if an officer asked for a man's 
driver's license at the same time a second officer was walking a drug dog around the car, 
would the fact that the man then put his wallet on his seat while waiting for the first officer 
to return with his license magically turn the wallet into a container subject to search if the 
dog alerted during the time the first officer was running the driver's record? Or, under 
the same circumstances (two officers), would a woman moving her purse off her lap and 
onto the passenger seat to reach for her registration in the glove compartment suddenly 
turn the purse into a "normal" container if the dog alerted at that moment? 
Finally, it is unreasonable and unsafe to expect women to wear purses while 
driving. Instead, it is only reasonable to require women to take their purses with them 
when leaving the car. This resumes the purse's normal state-attached to the person. 
Here, Ms. Easterday's purse was on the seat next to her where a woman normally 
puts a purse when driving. What matters is that she took it with her when she stepped 
out the car. But it is evident from the suppression hearing that the prosecutor did not 
agree with this conclusion, and the district court was struggling with the prosecutor's 
argument. For example, at one point, the district court asked the prosecutor "So the 
lesson is that if you're driving down the road, and you know you're about to get busted 
up, you've got to open your purse, pick up your purse and hold onto it?" (Tr. 10/25/13, 
p.20, Ls.8-11.) The prosecutor replied "Absolutely." This approach is not in line with 
precedent. And the district court's ruling misinterpreted that precedent and did not 
consider the ramifications and practical realities of such an interpretation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Easterday respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied her motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2014. 
J . ·----~- ~y< ,~ .: 
EEO P. ANOE S. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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